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ABSTRACT 
What we know about whales is sufficient for ascribing to them the 
analogues of human rights, including the fundamental right to be 
treated with respect. Once we recognize their possession of this right, 
it follows that whales are not to be used or exploited by us for the pro-
motion of our ends, however "benign" they may appear. In the case of 
humans, to refrain from killing them is to discharge only a small part 
of our total duties. We must also refrain from exploiting them, whe-
ther "consumptively" or "nonconsumptively." Having come as far as 
we have in our understanding of the moral ties that binds humans and 
whales, we must now go further in our deeds. Just as whales are not 
here for us to kill for our purposes, so they are not here for us ''to 
study," or "to watch," or "to play with." The moral task before us is 
the most difficult. It is to let whales alone. 
*Presented to WHALES ALIVE: A Global Conference on the Nonconsumptive Utiliza-
tion of Cetacean Resources, Boston, MA, 6 June 1983. 
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In 1946 representatives of fourteen governments met in Wash-
ington to sign the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling. This was the meeting that established the International 
Whaling Commission. The declared purpose of the Convention was to 
safeguard the "great natural resources represented by whale stocks" 
in order to "make possible the orderly development of the whaling in-
dustry" (International Whaling Commission 1946). 
Since 1946 attitudes towards whales have changed enormously 
both within the IWC and among the general world population. Public 
opinion surveys have indicated that in most countries, including J a p-
an, opposition to whaling is the majority sentiment. The IWC, andes-
pecially its Scientific Committee, has reflected this shift in opinion, as 
well as playing a role in bringing it about. The Commission has con-
tributed to our knowledge of whales by supporting the collection and 
collation of scientific data. This in turn has focused attention on the 
plight of the planet's largest mammals. In its 1980 Washington con-
ference the IWC even began to explore tentatively the ethical issues in-
volved in killing cetaceans. Today it seems to many that the IWC is as 
involved in protecting whales as in protecting the whaling industry. 
There seem to be at least two sources for this shift in attitudes towards 
whales. 
First, recent research has suggested that whales are remarkably 
intelligent and sensitive creatures. Exactly how sensitive and intelli-
gent, and how exactly these terms are to be applied to whales, is dif-
ficult to say, however. There are serious problems involved in studying 
whales. They live in very different environments than we do. The 
course of their evolutionary history has been very different, and there 
are also significant variations among species. Still, some things are 
known. Whales have extraordinarily large brains. Some have about 30 
billion neurons in their neo-cortex compared to about 10 billion in 
humans. With brain to body ratios that are similar to those of the high-
er primates, their brains are also highly differentiated and exhibit a 
high degree of folding of the cortical surface. For these reasons one of 
the leading researchers in the field, P .J. Morgane, has claimed: 
... only the brain of whales and men have the amount and quality 
of neocortex making both appear at the pinnacle of the animal 
kingdom ... (Frost 1979). 
In addition, whales have extremely rich behavioral repertoires, sophis-
ticated communication systems, and complex forms of social organiza-
tion. Whatever finally may be decided about the exact nature of whale 
intelligence and sensitivity, it has become increasingly clear that 
whales are comparable to the higher primates and perhaps even to hu-
mans. For this reason it has seemed to many that killing whales for 
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their blubber and oil is a moral crime akin or even equivalent to wan· 
ton murder. 
A second reason why attitudes towards whales have changed is 
due to the apparent harmony in which whales live with their environ-
ment. Millions of years before our ancestors came out of the trees 
whales had already evolved to about their present state, and they were 
living lives very much like the ones they live today. For millions of 
years they were clearly the most intelligent beings on the planet. Seen 
from this perspective, we are evolutionary upstarts. In an incredibly 
short period of time we have become masters of the planet. And what 
do we do? We devote ourselves to destroying all other intelligent forms 
of life. But at least we are consistent. We seem just as willing to 
destroy ourselves as well. For people who despair at the havoc humans 
have wrought, whales are role models. They are symbols of how intelli-
gent beings can live joyful, peaceful lives in harmony with their en-
vironment. From this point of view, whales are the teachers, we the 
students, about the things that really matter. 
Whether or not we are willing to fully accept either of these lines of 
thought doesn't really matter. It is clear that we have all come a long 
way since 1946 in our attitudes towards whales. To some degree this 
Conference marks the progress we have made. Instead of talking about 
"maximum sustainable yields" we are now talking about "whales 
alive" and the "nonconsumptive utilization of cetacean resources." 
In the light of the progress we have made it would be nice to say 
that we have gone far enough, that we are on the verge of a new era in 
which we give the whales their due. If this were the case, this Con-
ference would be the occasion for a double celebration: one for the 
whales, and one for us for celebrating them. We shall argue, however, 
that although we have freed ourselves from the worst aspects of the 
anthropocentric ethic, which holds that everything on the planet only 
has value insofar as it has value to us-our ends, our purposes, our in· 
terests-we have not yet fully liberated ourselves from its lingering 
vestiges. 
Not everyone will be willing to accept what we say. But whatever 
beliefs we finally come to, it is important that we be willing from time 
to time to reconsider them, and to scrutinize honestly the fundamental 
presuppositions and commitments on which they are based. We hope 
that this paper will be a contribution to such a reconsideration. 
First we shall argue that what we know about whales is sufficient 
for ascribing to them the analogues of human rights, including a right 
to life, a right that is violated by those whaling practices that we are 
beginning to put behind us. We shall argue further that this right is 
undergirded by a more fundamental right that whales share with hu-
mans: a right to be treated with respect. It is this right which would be 
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violated by allowing, for instance, exploitative benign research on hu-
mans. And it is this right that is violated when we treat whales as "ce-
tacean resources." Next we shall discuss some of the implications of 
our view for the concerns of this Conference. 
WHALE RIGHTS 
To credit whales with a comparatively sophisticated mental life is 
hardly new. It is in the spirit of Darwin who claimed repeatedly that 
conciousness forms a continuum; the mental life of the higher animals 
differs from our own only in degree, not in kind. Any rationally viable 
ethic of how whales ought to be treated must take their mental sophis-
tication into account. And it is the demonstrable failure to do this that 
exposes the grave inadequacy of the "ethic" that allows these animals 
to be viewed and treated as a resource for us, as if they were trees or 
mineral deposits. Just as Bonnie is not a resource for Clyde, nor Clyde 
for Bonnie, so whales are not a resource for us-though of course they 
can be, and almost always are, treated as if this is their ''place in the 
scheme of things.'' That we are, so to speak, on all fours with whales on 
this morally crucial matter will be seen more clearly once we reflect on 
the philosophical underpinnings of why we do, and should, deny that 
human beings are to be viewed and treated as other peoples' resources. 
In our case we avoid this impoverished view by postulating that 
we have a different kind of value. Sometimes this is said to be our 
worth, or our dignity, or our sanctity; sometimes, as in Kant's writ-
ings, the root idea is expressed by saying that human beings exist as 
"ends in themselves." That is to say, people as individuals have their 
own projects and purposes that imbue their lives with meaning. As a 
member of the human community I recognize that others have virtues 
and excellences which they strive to develop more fully. I may not 
share their conception of virtue and of the good, but I recognize that 
they, like me, have legitimate ends which they pursue, which are 
valuable to them, and so if I am to be moral I must treat them as in-
dependent beings with their own excellences-as "ends in 
themselves." Let us here call the kind of independent, nonresource 
value attributed to individual humans inherent value. It is because we 
have such value that we must not be treated in ways that fail to show 
respect for us as individuals, and respect is not shown whenever we are 
treated in ways that assume that our value is reducible to how much 
we answer to or advance the interests of others-as if, that is, we exist 
as a resource for others. Acts and institutions that fail to treat us with 
appropriate respect, from a deceitful promise to slavery, are to be 
morally condemned. Or so it is commonly believed. Were we to grant 
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this much, how could we rationally avoid the same view about the 
value of whales, since they too seem to have their own virtues and ex-
cellences? How could we rationally defend, that is, the view that we 
have this special kind of nonresource value-inherent value-but they 
do not? 
Many possibilities come to mind: Whales lack immortal souls. 
Whales lack moral autonomy and reason. Whales lack the ability to en-
ter into contracts. Whales lack the ability to choose between alterna-
tive life-plans. And so on. Some of these claims are almost certainly 
false. But even if they are granted, for argument's sake, they neither 
singly nor collectively provide a rationally satisfactory basis for affirming 
inherent value in our case while denying it in the case of whales. For 
example, even if it is true that we do, but whales do not, have immortal 
souls, nothing whatever follows concerning the sort of value each of us 
has during our terrestial life. Again, that whales lack the ability to 
recognize the inherent value of others, should this be true, is no better 
reason to deny that they have such value than it would be to say that a 
daffodil cannot be yellow because it lacks the ability to recognize that 
lemons are yellow too. And as for the other sorts of considerations 
mentioned (for example, that whales lack, but humans possess, auto-
nomy and reason), each conveniently overlooks the fact that many 
human beings who we regard as having inherent value-young 
children, the senile, and the mentally enfeebled, for example-are 
similarly deficient. We do not, and we should not, treat these human 
beings as if they exist as a resource for those of us who, as luck has it, 
happen to possess the list of favored attributes under review. To per-
sist in viewing and treating whales, creatures who, it bears emphasiz-
ing, have a mental life of greater sophistication than many human be-
ings, as if they exist as a resource here for us, their value to be 
measured in terms of how much they answer to and advance human in- . 
terests, while denying that the same is true in the case of these 
humans-to persist in doing this is neither rationally nor morally 
defensible. Rationally, we are inconsistent in judging relevantly 
similar cases in dissimilar ways; morally, we are prejudiced because we 
draw moral boundaries on the basis of a biased consideration (namely, 
species membership), a tragic moral failing in the case of our dealings 
with animals that is not unlike other failings, such as racism and sex-
ism, in our dealings with one another. For just as the moral status and 
value of a human being does not turn on such biological considerations 
as race or sex, so the moral status and value of an individual, whether 
human or cetacean, does not turn on the different biological considera-
tion of species membership. 
There is an obvious way around these charges of prejudice and incon-
sistency: give up the belief in our own inherent value. This is an op-
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tion that will tempt some, but few on reflection will give in. And that is 
a good thing too. For the moral theory we would be obliged to put in 
the place of one that recognizes our independent, nonresource value 
will prove to be weak at the joints, unable to stand up under the weight 
of sustained, fair, and informed criticism (Regan 1983). So we do well 
not to make a shambles of our theoretical understanding of interhu-
man right and wrong in order to avoid recognizing our prejudice and 
inconsistency when it comes to the value of individuals beyond our 
species' borders. We do well, that is, to expand our moral vision rather 
than to close our eyes to our human fallibilities. 
The inherent, nonresource value of a human being is the linchpin of 
the idea that individual human beings have basic moral rights, in-
cluding such rights as the rights to life, to liberty, and to privacy. If 
Jack is to show respect for Jill's inherent value, he is obliged to respect 
her rights; he must not do anything to her that reduces her status in 
the world to that of a mere resource for others. Thus must he not kill 
her, for example, so that he, or his children, or the chronically destitute 
can have more of what they want or need; nor may he limit her freedom 
or invade her privacy just because he or others stand to reap some ben-
efits, whether the benefits be monetary, recreational, or scientific. To 
recognize the inherent value and basic moral rights of a human being is 
to accept the moral inviolability of the individual. Like "No Trespass" 
signs, our basic rights mark off the boundaries of that unique ''moral 
space" which, as individuals, we each occupy. 
These same signs come into view once we accept the inherent, non-
resource value of whales-and, with this, their basic rights. This is not 
to say that they do or must have every right a human being has-the 
right to vote, for example, or the right to attend the church of their 
choice. The basic rights they do have are those they can have. These in-
clude the ones mentioned earlier-rights to liberty, to privacy, to life, 
and to pursue their own wellbeing or happiness, all violated in a flash, 
one might say, when whales are killed for their meat or blubber, their 
oil or bone. But are any of these rights violated when, as many aspire 
to, we view and treat whales as objects that satisfy and advance our 
scientific, recreational, or, in either case, our economic interests? That 
is the central question that remains to be considered. 
WHALE WRONGS 
Let us consider the recreational uses of whales first. One way that 
people use whales for recreational purposes is by observing them in 
their natural habitat. Each winter in California, for example, thou-
sands of people view the gray whale migration. Whales and other ceta-
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ceans are also kept in captivity so that they can be used for recrea-
tional purposes. Aquatic parks like Seaworld and Marineland train 
cetaceans to perform tricks for the pleasure of paying customers. 
In the previous section we said that if whales have rights then 
they must be treated with respect. Their value and dignity does not 
rest on their place in our plans, purposes and projects. From this 
perspective our exploitation of whales for recreational purposes is not 
morally acceptable. They are not nature's toys to be "oohed" and 
"aahed" at by humans. They are not human artifacts made by us to 
fulfill our intentions. They are creatures of inherent value with lives of 
their own and the capacity to lead them in their own ways. To confine 
them in aquatic parks and to make them perform tricks that people 
find amusing is to try to remake them into our own creations. This at-
tempt to appropriate such marvelous and magnificent creatures for 
such trivial purposes, denying them their liberty in the bargain, is 
morally to be condemned. 
The commercial whale-watching industry-often viewed as the 
"benign" substitute for commercial whaling-is similarly unaccepta-
ble, though for a different reason. Whales do not exist as visual com-
modities in an aquatic free market, and the business of taking eager 
paying sightseers into their waters, though nonconsumptive, is ex-
ploitative nonetheless, morally analogous to making a business of con-
ducting sightseeing tours of human beings who either cannot or do not 
give their consent to be exploited by other people in this way. More-
over, just as Grayline Tours of the black ghetto, or the barrio, or· the 
gay community would tend to dehumanize and trivialize those whose 
very lives were being regarded as objects of curiosity and amusement, 
so it is also true in the case of the whales. 
The "nonconsumptive uses" of whales for scientific purposes are 
extremely diverse. They include observing them in aerial surveys, re-
cording their sounds, taking samples of tissues and fluids, and observ-
ing their behavior while held in captivity. Though ''nonconsumptive,'' 
all too often whales are again directly treated as means to our ends. 
They are studied to satisfy our scientific curiosity or to test our scien-
tific theories. Even so apparently harmless an activity as aerial view-
ing for purposes of population estimates should not completely escape 
moral skepticism, if the object is to determine whether a given species 
is at risk of extinction. Such studies foster, and are often in the service 
of, a false understanding of whales-as if, for example, the death of a 
whale matters only when a species is endangered. As with humans, so 
also with whales, it is individuals, not species, who have rights. We 
must take care not to accept that science that smothers the individual 
whale in numbers, graphs, charts, and so on. And we must also free 
ourselves from those enterprises that help perpetuate the general view 
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that whales exist as one or another kind of resource, to be thought of in 
terms of "herds" or "stocks." To the extent that population and mi-
gratory studies are cut from this cloth, to that extent, and for that rea-
son, they are wrong (Jamieson and Regan 1982; Regan 1983). 
In defense of research on captive cetaceans it will be said that we 
overlook the many benefits, both real and potential, that have and will 
accrue for the animals themselves as a result of our scientific under-
standing of them. We have learned something about the maladies of 
cetaceans in captivity and as a result of this we are now better able 
both to prevent and cure them in the case of those animals now in our 
care. Like all benefits, however, the morality of those in question 
depends on the means used to secure them. And no benefits are moral-
ly to be allowed if they are obtained at the price of violating individual 
rights. Because, then, keeping these animals in captivity violates their 
rights, the gains obtained for whales and other cetaceans are ill-got-
ten. To take the rights of an individual whale seriously is to believe 
that individual whales no more exist as a source of benefits for other 
whales than they do for us. 
Two kinds of response might be given to our argument. First, it is 
often said by people who work with whales and dolphins that these 
animals enjoy their interactions with humans, even those in experi-
mental settings. Just as people like observing whales, so whales enjoy 
observing people. If this is correct then perhaps it can be said that in 
many cases whales "consent," in some sense, to be the subjects of 
benign research and to be entertainers in aquatic parks. If this is true 
then such "nonconsumptive uses" do not harm them, or if they do 
harm them, they do not violate their rights. It is difficult to know what to 
make of this claim. We should remember, however, that similar claims 
have often been made about oppressed humans as well as about other 
animals. It was said in defense of slavery that blacks enjoyed picking 
cotton and being taken care of by the master. It was said in defense of 
sexism that women preferred to stay home and do housework, and not 
compete in the cutthroat male world. Frequently today we see televi-
sion commercials depicting happy cows and chickens, more than eager 
to lay down their lives for the sake of our palates. Perhaps these claims 
about the voluntary cooperation of cetaceans are true, but in the light 
of this history we should be highly skeptical. It is extremely doubtful 
that we add anything to the quality of cetacean life by our presence, 
more than doubtful that our absence would be missed by them. 
The second response is that the "nonconsumptive use" of whales 
is important, because the whales themselves are the main beneficiaries 
of increases in our knowledge. This argument takes two forms. 
The first claims that as a matter of realpolitik, whales will be killed 
as long as it is economically profitable to do so. If it can be shown that 
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"nonconsumptive uses" of whales are economically preferable, then 
whaling will cease. There are a number of problems with this argu-
ment. First, it presupposes that "consumptive" and "nonconsump-
tive" uses of whales are mutually exclusive. James E. Scarff has 
argued that this is not the case (Scarff 1980). He cites as an example 
the fact that the Russians kill various numbers of gray whales every 
year in the Artie Ocean, without any apparent effect on the California 
whale-watching industry, even though both industries exploit the 
same species of whale. This suggests that nonconsumptive uses could 
simply add to rather than subtract from our repertoire of cetacean ex-
ploitation. But second, realpolitik is, so to speak, a two-edged sword. 
Even if it can be shown that whaling is an economically inferior use of 
whales relative to "nonconsumptive" uses, that still would not put the 
anti-whaling position on a firm foundation, since to accept the argu-
ment in this form suggests that whaling should continue if it can be 
shown to be the economically optimal use of whales. And while whal-
ing may not be economically optimal now that whale populations are 
so low, there is no guarantee that the economic equation won't change 
in the future. The basic problem with this argument is, then, that it is 
analogous to saying that the reason we ought not to kill derelicts is 
because it is not economically efficient to do so. One would have 
thought the reason against this has nothing whatever to do with dol-
lars and cents; and this is what we have argued is true of whales as well. 
The second form of this argument suggests that the more we learn 
about whales the better able we will be to protect them. This argument 
undoubtedly has merit. We would not be in a position today to argue 
for the rights of whales were it not for the scientific research that has 
been done. And if we could be certain that additional benign research 
would redound to the benefit of the whales, who could oppose it? But 
again, history provides reason for skepticism. Sad though it is to say, 
science has been more often used against animals than for them. In the 
past we mainly have studied animals in order to make them a better 
resource rather than to ensure that they have better lives. By its very 
nature scientific knowledge is public information, and scientists are 
not in a position to control its uses. Sidney Holt has given one such ex-
ample in which the results of benign research involving wolves is now 
being used against them (Global Conference on Non-Consumptive Utili-
zation of Cetacean Resources 1983). Who can have confidence that this 
will not be the case with the whales as well? Even if we are motivated 
to do benign research on whales by the desire to improve their lot, we 
should be skeptical of our ability to do that. We have learned over and 
over again that human intervention in complicated natural systems 
often only makes things worse. Trying to be friends of the whales may 
only be another way of making us their enemies. 
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What we owe the whales is the recognition that they too are the 
bearers of moral rights, worthy of our respect. Once we are willing to 
accept, as we should, the idea that whales have the right not to be killed 
or needlessly harmed, consistency demands that we then acknowledge 
that they also have the right not to be exploited for the promotion of 
our ends, however "benign" they might appear, whether such exploita-
tion is "consumptive" or "nonconsumptive." Having come as far as 
we have in understanding the moral ties that bind humans and whales, 
we must now go further in our deeds. Just as whales are not here for us 
to kill for our purposes, so they are not here for us "to study," or "to 
watch," or "to play with." The moral task before us is the most dif-
ficult because the most hidden and possibly self-sacrificial: It is to let 
whales alone, satisfied with the mere knowledge that these "other na-
tions" continue to roam the vast reaches of the oceans in no small 
measure because of our principled efforts to save and preserve them. 
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